What Education’s
Policymakers Can Learn from the Enron Collapse
An Occasional Paper by J. E.
Stone
Education
Consumers ClearingHouse
November 2002
Conflicts of interest, biased research, and bad advice
to investors led to Enron’s financial collapse. Investments in education have failed for essentially the same
reason. It is a lesson education’s
policymakers need to learn. Agencies
that produce and disseminate educational research cannot be faithful to both
investors and providers. Providers want
rosy assessments and investors need candid ones. The Bush administration’s new Institute of Education Sciences is
supposed to correct the problem but it faces the same pressures that have
shaped the other publicly funded research and policy sources. Policymakers need watchdogs that bark. They should pay attention to performance,
not rhetoric.
Conflicts of interest, biased research, and bad
advice to investors led to Enron’s financial collapse. Investments in education have failed for
essentially the same reason. The Bush
administration’s new Institute of
Education Sciences is an attempt to correct the problem.
The Institute replaces the U. S. Department of
Education’s Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OREI). It joins a new What Works Clearinghouse
and an Office
of Innovation and Improvement. All
three aim to increase the “scientific rigor” of the research that informs
education policy decisions.
Without question, improvement is needed. Says Rep. Michael N. Castle, chairman of the
U. S. House’s Subcommittee on Education Reform, “I want quality educational
research, not fads or anecdotes.”
But will the new offices avoid the pitfalls that
undermined the efforts of their predecessors?
There is reason for optimism, but change will ultimately
require policymakers to gain a new understanding of why educational research
has failed them in the past.
Serving Two Masters
In the 1970s and ‘80s, a federal entity whose
mission it was to disseminate effective programs to the schools — the National
Diffusion Network (NDN) — examined the outcomes of the Follow Through
project. Follow Through was the very
kind of rigorous, large-scale trial that the new Institute of Education
Sciences hopes to promote. However,
instead of encouraging schools to adopt the best programs, NDN recommended that
schools consider both the effective and the ineffective programs, and that the
poor performers be given added funding because of their greater need to
improve!
The problem was conflict of interest. Many teachers disagreed that their favored
programs were ineffective, and strongly defended them. Policymakers, by contrast, lacked the information
and expertise to disagree with the NDN assessment. By recommending both the effective and ineffective programs, NDN
avoided jeopardizing its support among educators or policymakers. The new Institute of Education Sciences will
face similar pressures and incentives.
Merrill Lynch and Enron
An instructive parallel can be drawn between
conflicts of interests in the education arena and the recent financial collapse
of the Enron Corporation. In that situation, firms that provide financial
research to investors were profiting from sales of the stocks that were being
researched.
In 1998, a Merrill Lynch securities analyst named John
Olson lost his job because he refused to give Enron a “buy” rating. Now a widely respected analyst, Olson
explained that many members of his profession rendered excessively optimistic
assessments because they were subjected to incentives and pressures from within
their brokerage firms.
Olson and his colleagues were responsible for
appraising stocks like Enron. At the
same time, other divisions within the same company were trying to promote and
sell them. “Buy” ratings were
encouraged because they promoted brokerage business from corporations like
Enron. “Sell” ratings did the opposite,
so they were rare.
Investors were taught a hard lesson. Owners and buyers have competing
interests. Owners benefit from rosy
assessments, and buyers benefit from candid assessments. Brokerage houses cannot be faithful to
both.
It is a lesson that education’s “investors” — i.e.,
policymakers — need to understand.
Conflicts of Interest in Research and
Evaluation
The information furnished to policymakers is
portrayed as impartial and objective, yet the parties that produce and
disseminate it often benefit from affirmative reports. The conflict may be subtle, but the
temptation to “put lipstick on a pig” is substantial. If a source of research-based guidance rarely finds fault with
policies and innovations (i.e., never issues “sell” ratings), it is unlikely to
be serving the interests of education’s investors and consumers.
A few years ago, Professor Herbert Walberg raised
this issue in an essay
questioning program evaluations conducted by their sponsors and
developers. Self-evaluation is
desirable, but his point was that inherent conflicts of interest are unnoticed
and self-assessments are mostly unaudited.
A less obvious but equally potent form of conflict
exists when programs hire outside contractors to assess their performance. For example, the National
Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) recently granted $6.6
million to 22 organizations to study various aspects of its teacher
certification process.
Exhibiting some sensitivity to the issue, NBPTS
engaged the services of the RAND Corporation to vet the proposals. Still, the transaction was one of a
well-funded program seeking external validation by contracting with researchers
who will benefit if the program prospers.
If favorable or even mixed results are found, NBPTS
will remain a “golden goose.”
Refinements will be implemented and additional assessments will be
needed. However, if findings are
negative, not only will NBPTS suffer, the contractor may become an undesirable
choice for other programs seeking self-evaluation.
See No Evil
Conflict of interest does not inevitably result in
bias. Rather it creates an incentive
for bias, and it is the bias that becomes visible over time.
In the course of the past 30 to 40 years,
policymakers have invested in countless educational innovations and
reforms. Few have produced substantial
improvement and many have been conspicuous failures. Virtually all, however, have been accompanied by “buy”
recommendations from educational researchers.
Perhaps policymakers should have been more
skeptical, especially about positive self-evaluations. However, policymakers rarely act without
information and advice from one or more of the governmentally funded
organizations and agencies that study, digest, and report on education research
and policy. So with all of this
guidance, why have so few failed initiatives been questioned, opposed, or
subjected to a post mortem? The short
answer is that most have been deterred by the same pressures that sidetracked
the NDN.
Organizations such as OREI, the regional education laboratories,
the state education agencies, and the many independent and
university-affiliated research and policy groups have been counseling
policymakers for decades, yet they have rarely detected or questioned what have
proven to be badly flawed programs. To
the contrary, they have mostly endorsed, disseminated, and implemented anything
that generates funding. In fairness,
however, studies with critical or negative findings do not often make it into
print.
Reviewing the archives of several education news
sources, I was struck by the paucity of references to cautionary reports
regarding the many educational fads of the last 20-30 years. Neither were there references to studies of
their financial or human costs. Surely
policymakers would benefit from knowing the who, what, where, and why of past
mistakes.
Was there lack of editorial interest? Not likely.
Negative assessments by major organizations typically stir controversy
and news coverage. For example, there
was extensive coverage of OREI’s criticisms of bilingual education and early
intervention programs in the days when Chester E. Finn, Jr. headed the
agency. Rather, the absence of
references seems to accurately reflect a benign silence toward fads and failures
by the governmentally funded, grant-seeking organizations that give guidance to
policymakers.
An Illustration
Earlier this year I authored a study
reporting that 16 Tennessee teachers who are both certified by the National
Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) and who have scores recorded
in the state’s value-added assessment system were merely average performers in
the classroom. It was a small study —
the state database contained only 16 teachers — but it remains the only study
that examines the linkage between NBPTS certification and objectively measured
student achievement. And it is the only one that suggests NBPTS should be
temporarily suspended and reexamined.
Given my findings, I expected NBPTS to be
displeased. What I did not expect was a
hurried announcement from the Education Commission of the States (ECS) that it
would form a panel of “unbiased, distinguished educators and researchers” to
review my study.
Figuratively speaking, ECS pulled off its
rose-colored glasses and took out its microscope. However instead of considering both the evidence for and against
NBPTS, only the study’s disquieting results were subjected to a hairsplitting
analysis.
The panel
concluded that my results might not be widely applicable, yet the central
finding remained: In 16 of 16 cases,
NBPTS certification overestimated teacher effectiveness; and the implication
for education’s investors was obvious.
The conflict faced by ECS was obvious as well. In a letter accompanying the panel report,
ECS president Ted Sanders acknowledged that there was no research showing that
NBPTS-certified teachers are more effective; yet he carefully avoided suggesting
that the absence of evidence was any reason for policymakers to resist
committing millions to NBPTS initiative.
By taking a wait-and-see approach, organizations
like ECS appear prudent and cautious.
In truth, they are making a virtue of necessity. Straddling the line between investors and
providers permits them to avoid controversy.
Policymakers Need to Assess Conflicts, Track
Records, and Loyalties
It is inevitable that educational initiatives that
spend millions of dollars attract lots of friends. Resisting their influence will be a stern challenge for the new
Institute of Education Sciences and its sister agencies. In Britain, Chris Woodhead, Her Majesty’s
Chief Inspector of Schools, was wholly independent yet he was virtually driven
from office by educational interests that resented his uncompromising
assessments.
What can increase the new agencies’ chance
for success is increased policymaker awareness of how research and policy
agencies have failed in the past and a more sophisticated approach to finding
investor-friendly sources of educational guidance.
Like the now-chastened Enron investors, policymakers
need to give greater weight to sources that are transparent with regard to
conflicts of interest, that have a sound record of policy assessments, and that
are demonstrably faithful to investor/consumer interests, i.e., sources that
issue both “buy” and “sell” recommendations.
Here are questions that might be asked:
·
Have
they issued any “sell” recommendations in the past — i.e., questioned the
merits of any of the education fads of the last 30 or so years, particularly
before the money ran out?
·
Have
they endorsed or promoted any of these same fads?
·
Have
they assessed the human and/or financial costs of fads and failures, or taken
other steps to help policymakers (and themselves) to avoid the same
mistakes?
·
Who
pays for their information and advice and who has been helped by it: investors
or providers?
Public education is a regulated monopoly staffed by
professionals whose aims and priorities do not necessarily match those of
parents, policymakers, and the public.
The notion that this gap can be bridged by rhetorical commitment to what
is “best for the children” or to a “balanced” or “unbiased” view is a
convenient fiction.
In truth, policymakers need
watchdogs that bark, not agencies whose need for self-preservation overrides
investor interests and deters all but the most oblique and reserved
criticisms. If policymakers want to
know whether the new agencies are loyal to education’s investors, they should
pay attention to their performance, not their rhetoric.
J. E. Stone (professor@education-consumers.com) is a
professor in the College of Education at East Tennessee State University and
principal partner of the Education Consumers Consultants Network
(www.education-consumers.com) – an affiliate of the Education Consumers
ClearingHouse.